汉娜·阿伦特

Arendt & Eichmann: The New TruthMark LillaHannah Arendta film by Margarethe von TrottaHannah Arendt: Ihr Denken veränderte die Welt [Hannah Arendt: Her Thought Changed the World]edited by Martin Wiebel, with a foreword by Franziska AugsteinMunich: Piper, 252 pp., €9.99 (paper)1.In The Drowned and the Saved, Primo Levi’s final book on his experiences at Auschwitz, he makes a wise remark about the difficulty of rendering judgment on history. The historian is pulled in two directions. He is obliged to gather and take into account all relevant material and perspectives; but he is also obliged to render the mass of material into a coherent object of thought and judgment:Without a profound simplification the world around us would be an infinite, undefined tangle that would defy our ability to orient ourselves and decide upon our actions…. We are compelled to reduce the knowable to a schema. lilla_1-112113-250.jpg Hannah Arendt Bluecher Literary TrustHannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy, Sicily, 1971Satisfying both imperatives is difficult under any circumstances, and with certain events may seem impossible. The Holocaust is one of those. Every advance in research that adds a new complication to our understanding of what happened on the Nazi side, or on the victims’, can potentially threaten our moral clarity about why it happened, obscuring the reality and fundamental inexplicability of anti-Semitic eliminationism. This is why Holocaust studies seems to swing back and forth with steady regularity, now trying to render justice to particulars (German soldiers as “ordinary men”), now trying to restore moral coherence (Hitler’s “willing executioners”).Among Primo Levi’s virtues as a writer on the Holocaust was his skill at finding the point of historical and moral equipoise, most remarkably in his famous chapter “The Gray Zone” in The Drowned and the Saved. It is not easy reading. Besides recounting the horrifying dilemmas and unspeakable cruelties imposed by the Nazis on their victims, he also gives an unvarnished account of the cruelties that privileged prisoners visited on weaker ones, and the compromises, large and small, some made to maintain those privileges and their lives. He describes how the struggle for prestige and recognition, inevitable in any human grouping, manifested itself even in the camps, producing “obscene or pathetic figures…whom it is indispensable to know if we want to know the human species.”Levi tells the story of Chaim Rumkowski, the vain, dictatorial Jewish elder of the Łódź ghetto who printed stamps with his portrait on them, commissioned hymns celebrating his greatness, and surveyed his domain from a horse-drawn carriage. Stories like these that others have told and others still have wished to bury are unwelcome complications. But Levi tells them without ever letting the reader lose sight of the clear, simple moral reality in which they took place. Yes, “we are all mirrored in Rumkowski, his ambiguity is ours, it is our second nature, we hybrids molded from clay and spirit.” But “I do not know, and it does not much interest me to know, whether in my depths there lurks a murderer, but I do know that I was a guiltless victim and I was not a murderer.”Two recent films by major European directors show just how difficult this point of equipoise is to find and maintain when dealing with the Final Solution. Margarethe von Trotta’s Hannah Arendt is a well-acted biopic on the controversy surrounding Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem and its place in her intellectual and personal life. Claude Lanzmann’s The Last of the Unjust is a documentary about Benjamin Murmelstein, the last Jewish elder of the Theresienstadt concentration camp, who was considered a traitor and Nazi collaborator by many of the camp’s inmates, and was the only elder in the entire system to have survived the war. The directors have very different styles and ambitions, which they have realized with very different degrees of success. But neither has managed to replicate Levi’s achievement.2.Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem was published fifty years ago, first as a series of articles in The New Yorker and then, a few months later, as a book. It’s hard to think of another work capable of setting off ferocious polemics a half-century after its publication. Research into the Nazi regime, its place in the history of anti-Semitism, the gestation of the Final Solution, and the functioning of the extermination machine has advanced well beyond Arendt, providing better answers to the questions she was among the first to address.In any normal field of historical research one would expect an early seminal work to receive recognition and a fair assessment, even if it now seems misguided. Yet that is only now starting to happen within the history profession, in works like Deborah Lipstadt’s judicious, accessible survey The Eichmann Trial (2011). As the strong reactions to von Trotta’s film indicate, though, the Arendt–Eichmann psychodrama continues in the wider world. Now as then critics focus on two arguments Arendt made, and on the fact that she made them in the same book.The first, and better known, was that although Adolf Eichmann was taken by many at the time to be the mastermind of the Final Solution, the trial revealed a weak, clueless, cliché-spewing bureaucrat who, according to Arendt, “never realized what he was doing,” an everyman caught up in an evolving bureaucratic program that began with forced emigration and only later ended with extermination as its goal. That one “cannot extract any diabolical or demonic profundity from Eichmann” did not, in her eyes, reduce his culpability. From the start Arendt defended his capture, trial, and execution, which were not universally applauded then, even by some prominent Jews and Jewish organizations.1 This her critics forget, or choose to forget. What they remember is that she portrayed Eichmann as a risible clown, not radically evil, and shifted attention from anti-Semitism to the faceless system in which he worked.Had Arendt written a book on what she called “the strange interdependence of thoughtlessness and evil” in modern bureaucratic society, it would have been read as a supplement, and partial revision, of what she said about “radical evil” in The Origins of Totalitarianism. No one would have been offended. But in Eichmann she made the unwise choice of hanging her thesis on the logistical “genius” of the Holocaust, whose character she tried to infer from court documents and a few glimpses of him in the bullet-proof glass docket in Jerusalem.To make matters worse, in the same book Arendt raised the sensitive issue of the part that Jewish leaders played in the humiliation and eventual extermination of their own people. These included the heads of the urban Jewish community organizations that facilitated forced emigration, expropriations, arrests, and deportations; and the heads of the Jewish councils the Nazis formed in the ghettos and camps to keep the inmate population in line. These men were understandably feared and resented even if they carried out their duties nobly, while those who abused their power, like Rumkowski, were loathed by survivors, who circulated disturbing stories about them after the war.There was little public awareness of these figures, though, until the Kasztner affair broke in the mid-1950s. Rudolph Kasztner was at that time an Israeli official, but during the war he had worked for a group in Budapest that helped European Jews get to Hungary, which was then unoccupied, and then tried to get them out after the German invasion in 1944. As thousands of Jews were being shipped daily to the gas chambers, Kasztner and his group entered into negotiations with the Nazis to see if some could be saved. After various plans to save large numbers failed, Kasztner persuaded Eichmann to accept a cash ransom and allow 1,600 Hungarian Jews to leave for Switzerland, many of them wealthy people who paid their way and others from his hometown and family.In 1953 a muckraking Israeli journalist claimed that Kasztner had secretly promised the Nazis not to tell other Jews about Auschwitz, trading a few lives for hundreds of thousands. Kastzner sued for libel but lost his case when it was revealed that he had written exculpatory letters to war tribunals for Nazis he had worked with in Hungary. Before his appeal could be heard Kastzner was assassinated in front of his Tel Aviv home, in circumstances that remain obscure to this day. He was posthumously acquitted.The cooperation of Jewish leaders and organizations with the Nazi hierarchy became more widely known through the Eichmann trial and the publication in 1961 of Raoul Hilberg’s monumental study, The Destruction of the European Jews, which Arendt relied on heavily without adequate attribution. Though Hilberg’s book is widely revered today, he was just as widely attacked after its publication by Jewish organizations and publications for emphasizing the leaders’ cooperation and the rarity of active resistance, which he attributed to habits of appeasement developed over centuries of persecution, an argument Bruno Bettelheim echoed a year later in his controversial article “Freedom From Ghetto Thinking.”So Hannah Arendt was not betraying any secrets when she discussed these issues in a scant dozen pages of her book; she was reporting on what came up at the trial and found herself in the middle of an ongoing, and very sensitive, polemic. But exercising her gift for the offending phrase, she also portrayed the Jewish leaders as self-deceived functionaries who “enjoyed their new power,” and she termed their actions “undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the whole dark story.”Perhaps by “dark” all she meant was especially awful and a sign of “the totality of the moral collapse the Nazis caused…not only among the persecutors but also among the victims.” But pulled out of context her phrases made it appear that she was equating doomed Jewish leaders with the “thoughtless” Eichmann, or even judging them more severely. In any case, the whole discussion, a small fraction of the book, was psychologically obtuse and made her monstrous in the eyes of many.And the response was ferocious, in Europe and the United States. Her now former friend Gershom Scholem sent Arendt a public letter complaining, rightly, about her “flippancy” and lack of moral imagination when discussing the Jewish leaders, and declared her to be lacking in “love of the Jewish people.” Siegfried Moses, a former friend and recently retired Israeli official, sent a letter “declaring war” on her and got the Council of Jews in Germany to publish a condemnation even before serialization of her book in The New Yorker was complete. (He then flew to Switzerland to try to persuade her to abandon the book project altogether.) The American Anti-Defamation League sent out a pamphlet titled Arendt Nonsense to book reviewers and rabbis across the country, urging them to condemn her and the New Yorker articles for giving succor to anti-Semites.And in the New York intellectual circles that had become her adoptive home, she became the focus of angry attention from friends who once admired her. At the controversy’s peak Dissent magazine organized a forum to discuss the work and invited Arendt (she declined), Hilberg, and their critics. Hundreds showed up and the evening quickly descended into a series of denunciations of Arendt, who was defended briefly only by Alfred Kazin, Daniel Bell, and a few others. Only when President Kennedy was assassinated in November did she finally escape the spotlight.3.This messy episode is the surprising focus of Margarethe von Trotta’s much-discussed new film. As von Trotta tells it, her original intention was to trace the arc of Arendt’s life as a whole, much as she did with Rosa Luxemburg in her award-winning biopic Rosa Luxemburg (1986), but found the material too unwieldy. And so she choose to limit herself to Arendt’s life in New York. As she says in the short German book on the film edited by Martin Wiebel, what interested her was not the ins and outs of the Eichmann case but rather Hannah and her friends. This seems an odd choice for a movie but makes sense in view of von Trotta’s other work. Her specialty is didactic feminist buddy movies—in fact, one might say that she’s been making the same film throughout her career. The story usually involves two women, either friends or sisters, one of them a visionary or pillar of strength, the other a jejune admirer, and follows the evolution of their relationship against a political backdrop.In her first solo directed work, The Second Awakening of Christa Klages (1978), a woman holds up a bank to save the child care center she works at, then gets help from a soldier’s wife who becomes her lover and goes into hiding with her. They end up in a rural Portuguese cooperative getting their consciousness raised, are expelled for lesbianism, and have other adventures before it all ends badly. Marianne and Juliane (1981) uses as its model the life of Gudrun Ensslin, a founding member of the Baader-Meinhof gang who committed suicide in her cell in 1977; the story follows the Gudrun character and her sister as their relationship develops from alienation to reconciliation, and ends in a display of sisterly solidarity that reaches beyond the grave.lilla_2-112113.jpg Bettmann/CorbisAdolf Eichmann with Israeli police at his trial in Jerusalem, May 1962Von Trotta’s Vision (1991), which treats the life of the medieval mystic Hildegard von Bingen, is the most transparent example of the type. It portrays a courageous, enlightened woman prone to epiphanies who stays true to her visions and resists the church’s attempts to silence her. Along the way she develops a deep if unequal friendship with another nun, then another, provoking jealousy and misunderstanding, though it all works out in the end. She dies revered by those around her, though not by the powers that be.And this, more or less, is the story of Hannah Arendt. The film opens with a jovial Arendt (Barbara Sukowa) in conversation with her best friend Mary McCarthy (Janet McTeer), who in the movie is reduced to a hyperactive sidekick. They discuss men, they discuss love, they have a cocktail party with Arendt’s devoted if wayward husband Heinrich Blücher (Axel Milberg) and fellow New York intellectuals. Then they get news of Eichmann’s capture and the imminent trial. More drinks, more discussion, and then Arendt is off to Jerusalem, where she witnesses the trial mainly from the press room (where she could smoke) and visits an old Zionist friend.Von Trotta deftly intersperses clips from the actual trial into her film and shows Arendt watching them on closed-circuit television in the press room. This device allows her to stage a conversion scene. As the camera slowly zooms in on Arendt watching Eichmann testify, we see on her face the dawning realization that he was not a clever, bloodthirsty monster but an empty-headed fool caught up in an evil machine. She leaves Jerusalem, writes her articles, and all hell breaks loose in New York.It is not true, as some reviewers have charged, that the film portrays Arendt as flawless. Throughout she hears complaints about her tone, from friends like McCarthy and her New Yorker editor William Shawn. She is also challenged repeatedly by her close friend the philosopher Hans Jonas (Ulrich Noethen), who is given some of the best lines in the movie (some drawn from Scholem’s letter). Jonas rejected the very idea of “thoughtless” murder and criticized her for lacking psychological sympathy for fellow Jews trapped in the most horrifying circumstances imaginable. Still, by and large, her critics are portrayed as irrational, defensive Jews who, unlike Arendt, refuse to think about the uncomfortable complexities of the Nazi experience, whether out of shame or omertà.But although Arendt defends herself and the task of “thinking” deftly throughout the film, particularly in a fine public speech at the end, we don’t see her arriving at her position through thinking. Film can portray inner psychological states through speech and action and image, but lacks resources for conveying the dynamic process of weighing evidence, interpreting it, and considering alternatives. Barbara Sukowa smokes and rifles through documents and stares into space like a silent picture star, but we get no sense of the play of a mind. And so we are left with the impression that she, like Hildegard, has had a vision.And perhaps this is how von Trotta sees Arendt. She admits in the book by Wiebel that she, like many on the German left in the 1960s and 1970s, turned their noses up at Arendt for comparing communism and Nazism as instances of totalitarianism and refused to read her books. But later she came upon Elisabeth Young-Bruehl’s biography and discovered a strong figure, a female philosopher engaged in political debate whose personal life was also rich in friends and lovers. This woman she could admire and celebrate. The problem is that von Trotta has chosen an episode in Arendt’s life where the stakes were so high, intellectually and morally, that they cannot in good taste be treated as the backdrop of a human interest story. Though the battle may be lost, it can never be emphasized enough that the Holocaust is not an acceptable occasion for sentimental journeys. But here it’s made into one, which produces weird, cringe-inducing moments for the viewer.In one shot we are watching Eichmann testify or Arendt arguing about the nature of evil; in the next her husband is patting her behind as they cook dinner. When Blücher tries to leave one morning without kissing her, since “one should never disturb a great philosopher when they’re thinking,” she replies, “but they can’t think without kisses!” As for the short, incongruous scenes about her youthful affair with Martin Heidegger, the less said the better.The deepest problem with the film, though, is not tastelessness. It is truth. At first glance the movie appears to be about nothing but the truth, which Arendt defends against her blinkered, mainly male adversaries. But its real subject is remaining true to yourself, not to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. In her director’s statement on the film von Trotta says that “Arendt was a shining example of someone who remained true to her unique perspective on the world.” One can understand von Trotta’s reluctance to get into the details of the Eichmann case, let alone foreshadow what we know about it now, which would have violated the film’s integrity. But something else seems violated when a story celebrates a thinker’s courage in defending a position we now know to be utterly indefensible—as Arendt, were she alive, would have to concede.Since the Eichmann trial, and especially over the past fifteen years, a great body of evidence has accumulated about Eichmann’s intimate involvement in and influence over the Nazis’ strategy for expelling, then herding, and then exterminating Europe’s Jews. More damning still, we now have the original tapes that a Dutch Nazi sympathizer, Willem Sassen, made with Eichmann in Argentina in the 1950s, in which Eichmann delivers rambling monologues about his experience and his commitment to the extermination project. These have recently been collated and analyzed by the German scholar Bettina Stangneth, and the passages she quotes in her new book are chilling:The cautious bureaucrat, yeah, that was me…. But joined to this cautious bureaucrat was a fanatical fighter for the freedom of the Blut I descend from…. What’s good for my Volk is for me a holy command and holy law…. I must honestly tell you that had we…killed 10.3 million Jews I would be satisfied and would say, good, we’ve exterminated the enemy…. We would have completed the task for our Blut and our Volk and the freedom of nations had we exterminated the most cunning people in the world…. I’m also to blame that…the idea of a real, total elimination could not be fulfilled…. I was an inadequate man put in a position where, really, I could have and should have done more.2 In the end, Hannah Arendt has little to do with the Holocaust or even with Adolf Eichmann. It is a stilted, and very German, morality play about conformism and independence. Von Trotta’s generation (she was born in 1942) suffered the shock of learning in school about the Nazi experience and confronting their evasive parents at home, and in a sense they never recovered from it. (She convincingly dramatizes one of these angry dinner table confrontations in Marianne and Juliane.) Even today this generation has trouble seeing German society in any categories other than those of potential criminals, resisters, and silent bystanders.When left-wing radicalism was at its violent peak in the 1970s the following false syllogism became common wisdom: Nazi crimes were made possible by blind obedience to orders and social convention; therefore, anyone who still obeys rules and follows convention is complicit with Nazism, while anyone who rebels against them strikes a retrospective blow against Hitler. For the left in that period the Holocaust was not fundamentally about the Jews and hatred of Jews (in fact, anti-Semitism was common on the radical left). It was, narcissistically, about Germans’ relation to themselves and their unwillingness, in the extreme case, to think for themselves. Von Trotta’s Hannah Arendt shares that outlook.And so, in part, did Eichmann in Jerusalem. Reading the book afresh fifty years on, one begins to notice two different impulses at work in it. One is to do justice to all the factors and elements that contributed to the Final Solution and understand how they might have affected its functionaries and victims, in surprising and disturbing ways. In this Arendt was a pioneer; and, as Bettina Stangneth notes in her contribution to Martin Wiebel’s book, many of the things she was attacked for have become the scholarly consensus.But the other impulse, to find a schema that would render the horror comprehensible and make judgment possible, in the end led her astray. Arendt was not alone in being taken in by Eichmann and his many masks, but she was taken in. She judged him in light of her own intellectual preoccupations, inherited from Heidegger, with “authenticity,” the faceless crowd, society as a machine, and the importance of a kind of “thinking” that modern philosophy had abolished. Hers was, you might say, an overly complicated simplification. Closer to the truth was the simplification of Artur Sammler in his monologue on Hannah Arendt in Saul Bellow’s 1970 novel Mr. Sammler’s Planet:Politically, psychologically, the Germans had an idea of genius. The banality was only camouflage. What better way to get the curse out of murder than to make it look ordinary, boring, or trite?… There was a conspiracy against the sacredness of life. Banality is the adopted disguise of a very powerful will to abolish conscience. Is such a project trivial? Claude Lanzmann’s recent film The Last of the Unjust leaves no doubt about the answer to that question. At the center of it is a remarkable interview he conducted in 1975 with Benjamin Murmelstein, the Jewish elder of Theresienstadt who survived the war. Murmelstein worked closely with Eichmann for seven years and saw through his camouflaging techniques; he even witnessed Eichmann helping to destroy a Viennese synagogue on Kristallnacht. Yet Murmelstein was also a master of the gray zone, a survivor among survivors whose reputation was anything but pristine. Lanzmann’s film plunges us into that zone and reveals more than perhaps even he realizes.—This is the first of two articles.

《汉娜•阿伦特》拥有一部成熟的传记片该有的样子，冷静、内敛、完整，不做作，不花俏，抛出了一个与普罗大众都相关的问题，让阿伦特这位20世纪最具思想性的女哲学家给予了答案。

当然，这个答案与哲学一样，魅力无穷，随着思考主体和背景的不同变换着光芒。

汉娜•阿伦特被誉为20世纪最伟大、最具原创性的思想家和政治理论家之一，深受导师海德格尔的喜爱，著于二战后的《极权主义的起源》，被欧美舆论界称为大师杰作。

受胡塞尔的现象学影响，中年著有《人的境况》，以思维与行动的概念迭代古典哲学中理论与实践的概念。

作为生于德国的犹太人，二战期间开始流亡旅居生活，50年代在美国教学，她是普林斯顿大学任命的首位女性正教授。

讲述这样一位不算家喻户晓的故事，是不容易的。

影片没有采用通常传记片的做法——浓缩叙事，即把人物一生中大名鼎鼎的事件描摹一遍，再辅以交叉蒙太奇渲染情绪，俘虏观众的判断，这是大多数名人传记片的拍法。

然而，这部德国电影充满批判的内涵，没有采取万花筒式的结构，而是客观坦率地再现与发现阿伦特对纳粹“死刑执行官”艾希曼的庭审观察，写就《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》后处于舆论风暴中的种种。

她的视角超越了犹太民族，也挑战了同胞们的情感认同。

拥有浩瀚哲学星空中最亮的那几颗星辰，德国思想界的严谨思辨传统对后世的影响一直都在。

本片绝不止于呈现这个极具话题和学术造诣的女哲学家个体，更意在表现犹太民族面对劫难的反思和质疑，回忆同胞逝去的扼腕和痛楚。

正是在一片民族阵痛中，阿伦特的警醒与思考显得振聋发聩。

她看到了一种“平庸的恶”，个体在纳粹极权政治下的麻木和不思考，人们犹如机器一般附庸作恶。

这种恶平庸又日常化，导致艾希曼一次次执行屠杀命令正是这种“平庸的恶”。

片尾，阿伦特的好友、同事、邻居、亲人，因为她高高在上的哲人姿态离她而去，她孤独地站在窗边自言自语道：他们都没有意识到，正是这种平庸的恶汇聚起激进的力量，造成了我们的不幸。

镜头转向阿伦特的哲学家丈夫，他揽过阿伦特的肩，问道：如果早知出版后会引发争议和批评，你还会出版吗？

阿伦特眉头一锁，说：我会。

阿伦特面对真理的诚实和勇气，并在此基础上坚持的公民精神，比他的老师兼恋人海德格尔走得更远。

作为基础存在论的弟子，阿伦特没有停留在海德格尔存在与此在的学说，而是将人的生命实践延伸为个体责任与政治生活的关系。

当中年的阿伦特每每陷入回忆中，一个象征性抚慰的画面就浮现了：少女阿伦特羞涩又好奇地站在海德格尔面前，提出质疑，海德格尔只说一句：思考是一份让人孤独的事业。

拍哲学家的传记片远比政客、科学家或是明星要难，常常会因为着力思维的快感与痛感显得晦涩艰深，而本片的两层叙事一张一弛。

一层用艾希曼庭审牵引，镜头在犹太幸存者之间平移。

庭外，阿伦特在耶路撒冷与挚友的对谈也外化为她的思索。

严谨的叙事推进，没有绕过任何重要的情节演进，直到阿伦特从堆积如山的资料和庭审录音里，找到了论点。

另一层有阿伦特的家人朋友们领着，带出她生活化的一面，话唠群戏像是在试探她的思维底线，当她和闺蜜、丈夫在一起时，每段台词和场景都透露着她本真的一面。

那些略带辩论味的形容词和对话，道出了一个女哲学家智性的叛逆和精致的淘气。

在与海德格尔重逢的中午，两人漫步在深秋的白桦林里，海德格尔再次表露爱意，又说教了一句：真正喜欢的东西，只出现在少年或是青年，就是所谓“爱在第一眼”。

玩笑间也有浓浓的形而上的腔调。

好在这腔调并不令人生厌，相反，也增添了本片的哲学意味。

作为一部传记片，高明之处在于没有刻意表现人物的拧巴和纠结，没有刻意把冲突和内心戏戏剧化，而是节奏稳健地只拍一个事件，毫不吝啬地沉溺着展示着她的思考，正如她主张的个体思考与伦理觉醒都是首要的。

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《漢娜．鄂蘭：真理無懼》：平庸之惡還是惡之平庸？

(原載於《時代論壇》一三七○期.二○一三年十二月一日)http://brucelaiyung.blogspot.hk/為甚麼歷史上會出現納粹大屠殺和文化大革命等滅絕人性的災禍？

即使幾個極度聰明、心裡滿懷惡念的人聯手，也無法造成規模那麼巨大的人道罪行。

參與那些惡行的，包括了無數平民百姓。

猶太裔哲學家漢娜鄂蘭（Hannah Arendt）經歷過二次大戰，從納粹德國的魔掌下逃亡到美國，畢生致力研究有關邪惡和極權的問題。

《漢娜．鄂蘭：真理無懼》這齣傳奇片，以鄂蘭在一九六一年在以色列見證「耶路撒冷大審」前後的事跡為主幹。

鄂蘭本是暴政的受害者，但她嘗試抽離而冷靜地思考邪惡根源和歷史責任的問題，結果惹來激烈的批評。

曾參與大屠殺的納粹軍官艾希曼（Adolf Eichmann）一九六○年被以色列擄走，並舉行公審。

在大學任教的鄂蘭向知識份子雜誌《紐約客》自薦，願意親臨大審現場，撰寫一份歷史紀錄。

艾希曼在審訊時的表現令鄂蘭感到詫異：他完全不像一個兇殘暴戾的惡魔，只是一個平凡人。

甚至可以說，他不是沒有道德感的，因為他堅持自己「盡忠職守」是應份的。

他推說，他不是親手殺人的兇手，他只是執行命令。

艾希曼的「純真」表現使鄂蘭不得不反思「邪惡是甚麼」的問題。

邪惡是有本質的嗎？

抑或邪惡只是良善之缺乏？

二○○八年上映的電影《讀愛》（The Reader）的女主角Hanna在二戰時也曾為納粹服務，而她只是一個文盲，幹甚麼都只是執行任務而已。

結果真實的艾希曼和Hanna都被視為戰犯而判刑。

鄂蘭除了把別人眼中的惡魔描述為一個平凡人之外，也把那些曾與納粹合作的猶太社群領袖牽進來，指他們也須對大屠殺負責。

她這樣的論點旋即惹來學界內外、猶太同胞與其他族裔的人、報章讀者與鄰居等各方的攻擊和恐嚇，說她背棄自己的同胞、違反人性、冷酷和高傲。

連大學也想中止她的教席，她卻堅拒妥協，並在大學講堂裡辯解時提出「Banality of Evil」的名言。

「Banality of Evil」多被譯作「平庸之惡」，偶爾引來誤解，認為這是從高高在上的精英姿態，詆譭平凡的普羅大眾，意味著他們本身蘊藏著一種邪惡的特質。

其實「Banality of Evil」的意思應是「邪惡的平庸面向」。

鄂蘭澄清，她不是說像艾希曼所做的事並非不邪惡，而他受刑也是罪有應得；她想指出的是邪惡不一定體現為滿懷惡念的魔君形式，猶如《讀愛》中目不識丁的女主角也是希特拉的化身。

邪惡會以「平庸」的方式體現於世，其特徵就是停止和拒絕獨立思考，只管跟隨比個人更大的國家機器和集體意識。

在巨大的邪惡之網羅籠罩之下，即使「盡責」本可稱為美德，一旦人們停止思考，彷彿把腦袋皆變為「外置硬碟」，結果仍是災難性的。

「盡忠職守有甚麼問題」的反詰，令人想起無數香港人的金科玉律：「都係搵食啫！

」香港人並非不會思考，只是把精力都放在「搵食」之上，公餘時間不想用腦，所以反智電視劇比國家地理頻道更吸引。

他們也不是不關心社會，只是那些高官和輿論領袖的「語言偽術」功力太高，真假難辨，只能順大勢而行。

《漢娜．鄂蘭：真理無懼》穿插著鄂蘭與德國哲學家馬丁海德格（Martin Heidegger）舊日交往的回憶片段：當日已婚的大學教授海德格與學生鄂蘭發展一段不倫關係。

一九三三年，海德格加入納粹黨並成為弗萊堡大學的校長，助紂為虐。

戰後二人重逢，海德格已是聲名狼藉，卻跟鄂蘭解釋說當時世局艱難，作為不諳政治的學者，他只是一時糊塗，很多人的攻擊也是無理中傷云云。

鄂蘭似乎被打動了。

電影對於鄂蘭和海德格的關係只是蜻蜓點水，主要是跟鄂蘭和現任丈夫的恩愛甜蜜作比較，卻沒有深入地勾劃鄂蘭、海德格和艾希曼之間的微妙關係。

儘管說艾希曼只是機器裡的一顆螺絲，但海德格怎能算是不會思考的平庸之輩？

電影也沒有提及戰後鄂蘭如何跟海德格回復曖昧的師友關係，幫助名聲掃地的他回復學術界的地位，而他也始終沒有真正悔改。

若編劇在鄂蘭和海德格的關係上著墨更深，或許會令電影沒那麼沉悶平板。

其實魔掌也是孤掌難鳴的，邪惡那平凡庸俗的一面，及其狡黠兇惡的一面實是渾成一體。

电影不好，但“审判”引发的现象和阿伦特的观念很可以再思考。

艾希曼为自己的辩护词归根到底无非是：我是一杆无辜的枪，不应为持枪者的罪行负责。

这也很好辩驳，因为人到底不应该是一杆枪，即便由于极端环境的压迫而丧失了坚持良心判断的可能。

但人仍然不是枪。

所以阿伦特的恶魔，再也不是那个头戴犄角在钢琴边诱惑浮士德，伴随着火焰和鲜血出场的上帝可尊敬的对手了。

恶魔变成了个长着一张平庸面孔，半秃，苍白，面对众人直出冷汗，坐在起居室里和沙发融为一体，走入丛林鸟兽不惊的那类人物。

审判其实给了艾希曼一个拉回人性高度的机会，他的最后结局（绞刑）其实远远高于他为自己所设下的情境判断。

影片中着重表现的仍是阿伦特对艾西曼的解读，也就是所谓“平庸的恶”。

但真正的他是否被异化得如此极端，很难看出来。

影片里的阿伦特角色存在感很单薄，要么抽烟，要么沉思，要么抽着烟沉思。

我总觉得最后一段激情澎湃的课堂演讲很俗套，代表邪恶方的校董们和眼神纯真的学生齐聚一堂，被英雄阿伦特的激情和公正抽离，严谨细致的学术态度所打动。

坏人最后灰溜溜离去，好人在纯真的孩子们心中播下种子。

这太好莱坞了，又不是死亡诗社或闻香识女人。

如果说阿伦特的朋友，同事和纽约客的读者们都在“误读”她，那凭什么一场课堂演讲就会避免学生们“误读”她呢？

这个价值判断在影片里显得很是简单粗暴。

倒是演讲结束后她的朋友汉斯对她的一番话很真实，她难道真的不仅仅就是一个高傲的西方哲学家吗？

影片也花了很多篇幅来交待她在立场上的困境和摇摆，可一直到结束我都没找到她对自己立场坚守的认同感。

处处都是矛盾和含混不清，如果她坚持用抽离和形而上的观点来对待艾西曼的审判，那早先她对海德格尔认同纳粹时“恶心”的表态岂不是很矛盾？

只许你判断别人，不许别人判断你，这未免也太霸道了些。

再比如，当海因里希不满地向她道出最后审判的结果的时候，她却极为淡定地说出他罪有应得。

到底是导演意图不清，还是刻意为之的灰色氛围，不得而知。

查资料的时候，看到这么一条很有趣，在康德看来，愚蠢是由邪恶的心灵引起的。

阿伦特却认为，平庸和愚蠢比邪恶更普遍。

这比康德有道理多了。

柔顺，平庸，服从，放弃思考，放弃自我心灵的对话，各方面都平板得惊人的人，往往催生最大的恶。

所以记得但丁在下炼狱第一层时，便为数不清的庸人准备了大锅般的地狱，不是最坏者下地狱，而是最平庸者垫锅底。

想一想罢，再看看现实，多有趣。

感觉并不会欺诈，判断却会。

Thinkers向人们分析和解释这个世界，和在其上发生的一切。

为的是不让人们的思想走上歧途，进而让这些事情不再发生，或一再发生。

一生中，我们要与太多事作斗争，不间断地、不减量地、很多时候不情愿地。

（看看阿伦特在电影中说了什么，再看看我在开头说的）The manifestation of the wind of thoughts is not knowledge, but the ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly. And I hope, that thinking gives people the strength to prevent catastrophes in these rare moments, when the chips are down.Sometimes, something is more important than someone.===========================结尾阿伦特在思索并自我验证：恶不可能既平凡又深刻。

恶总是extreme，而不可能是radical，只有善良可以同时又deep又radical。

翻译的不见得准确，所以也无法仔细去理解她的意思。

如果不善不恶是一种中间态，不假思索的行善和作恶各为+1，那么有意识的善举和恶行，它们的难易程度是有差异的。

作恶需要躲避他人的审视、内心的纠结、道德的评判，还可能有来自法律和习俗的惩罚，一进一出，善与恶的使力比为0:2。

也就是说，达到同样程度的善与恶，后者要比前者投入更多的力气，这里当然实际操作的力气和思考所花费的心力。

如果善是一种绿色气体，而恶是红色气体，注入同样的硬质透明容器，红色的颜色要比绿色更深。

而如果红色的浓度和绿色一样，则代表着量的减少，也就是说思考的不够。

换句话说，如果恶的结果没能配得上为它付出的思考，那么也就没有值得的恶。

从另一个角度来说，难道恶都是来自于人们轻浮的想象？

或是一种便于描述的归类？

比如恶魔，比如撒旦，但没有这样的东西啊。

如果善的极致是∞，那么从上面的推论，恶的极致就应该是∞+2，但没有这样的东西啊。

因此，才是banality of evil，而不是evilness of banality. 所以，几乎一切的恶都是降了智的、思考不足的产物。

============================对于全人类，阿伦特这样的思想者太重要。

而对于她个人来说，这样的思考深度非常不划算。

人们达成共识的条件要求异常苛刻，却对煽动和情绪极为热衷。

比如说起中医，是不是众说纷纭？

即便是吸烟，想要达成一致也不太容易。

那么对于放射暴露呢？

汉娜·阿伦特提出了她的著名观点，认为艾希曼所犯下的罪行，并非极端之恶，而是平庸的恶，那是在邪恶体制之下，每个小人物都可能犯下的恶。

因为他们彻底放弃了思考的权利，以制度之思想代替了自己的思考。

你放弃思考，让制度的思想取代自己的思想，必然会丧失自己的良知，必然导致平庸之恶，众多的平庸之恶，必然会导致整个社会灾难的发生。

恶一向都是激进的，它没有深度也没有魔力。

它可能毁灭整个世界，恰恰是因为它的平庸！

极权国家没有真相，民众得不到真相，最高统治者也由于信息被层层过滤、隐瞒，同样得不到真相，而知道真相的人，因为恐惧更不敢说出真相。

所以，国家到处欣欣向荣。

当罪恶的链条足够长，长到无法窥视全貌时，那么每个环节作恶的人都有理由觉得自己很无辜。

思考所表现出来的，不是知识，而是分辨是非的能力，判断美丑的能力。

——汉娜·阿伦特

汉娜·阿伦特 (2012)8.22012 / 德国 卢森堡 法国 / 剧情 传记 / 玛加蕾特·冯·特罗塔 / 芭芭拉·苏科瓦 珍妮·麦克蒂尔

本片几乎没有娱乐属性。

对汉娜阿伦特一无所知的观众，可能会看得有点费劲。

因为……里面出现的人物众多，谈话中还夹杂了一些无关紧要的人名，一次又一次考验观众的眼力和记性。

如果你耐着性子把整本电影看完了，可能会被结尾的演讲所震撼，但回过头来想想前面细碎冗长的铺垫，会不会觉得有点“头轻脚重”？

至少我看第一遍的时候就是这种心态，看完第二遍，我有了新的发现——前面的“铺垫”才是本片想要完整呈现的阿伦特。

一般的传记片以时间为序，记录人物在不同年代的经历，本片没走这条寻常路，而是通过一件事来展现阿伦特这个人。

所以除了要讲清楚阿伦特报道艾希曼审判的来龙去脉，还要交代阿伦特的过往：有些可以通过她的叙述完成，有些必须再现当时的场景，比如阿伦特和海德格尔具有时间跨度的感情线，穿插在电影的不同处，直接导致了时间线的跳跃。

海德格尔晚年幽居山林，阿伦特几乎每年都去探望他，两人保持着一种“友达以上，旧情未满”的微妙关系。

电影如实展现两人悠闲的林间漫步，以及海德格尔猝不及防的炽热表白。

如果观众对此毫不知情，难免满头问号：这个阿伦特和老公那么恩爱，一言不合就把嘴亲上了，怎么转个身又在森林里和旧情人搞暧昧？

仔细想来，真不能怪满头问号的观众，本片对于汉娜的感情世界，表达得实在隐晦。

电影开篇就是关于婚姻的讨论，闺蜜玛丽麦卡锡红杏出墙要离婚，汉娜劝她冷静些，没有人是完美的。

“你要么接受男人的本性，要么就自己一个人过。

”言下之意，睁一只眼闭一只眼才是阿伦特的“美满秘诀”。

阿伦特和丈夫海因里希，从某种意义上说，是包容开放的婚姻关系。

影片多次暗示海因里希在外偷腥，而阿伦特表现得毫不在意，哪怕闺蜜都提出了质疑。

海因里希也不干涉阿伦特和海德格尔的通信，各自放飞。

普通人难以想象，一对如此亲密无间的伴侣，明里暗里可能进行着某种形式的越轨……你和幸福浪漫的婚姻，差的只是一只闭上的眼睛。

闺蜜玛丽麦卡锡在片中的存在感非常强，当汉娜的文章遭受抨击，她冲到第一线反击，当汉娜暂居乡下小屋时，只有她手握一束鲜花去探望……发自内心的欣赏，是一切美好关系的基石。

阿伦特在1975年猝然离世之后，麦卡锡发表了一篇《怀念汉娜》：汉娜是最不爱出风头的一个人。

她从来不深思熟虑自己给别人的印象。

所以，不管什么时候，只要公开演讲，她都严重怯场，结束后，她只会问“还行吧？

”自然，她也不会在私下或者公共场合逢场作戏，即便是社交中常常需要的一点逢迎，她都不会，她不擅长假装。

虽然她总是骄傲于自己作为欧洲人，挺会说谎的，而不是像我们这些莽撞的美国人，总是把真相脱口说出，在这一点上，她有点小小的傲慢。

但是，这点小小的骄傲，从来和她真正的成就没有关系。

在我和她成为朋友的这么长时间，我想我从没有听她说过一次谎，哪怕是善意的谎言。

如果她发现你写的什么东西不好，她才不会拐弯抹角地跟你说，而是毫无例外地，把她的想法大声地告诉你。

我觉得这段文字很能说明阿伦特的性格，这就引出了接下来我想讨论的一点——真实的阿伦特到底是怎样的？

看完电影，我觉得芭芭拉苏科瓦表演细腻，眉宇之间情感流转，把一个女性在舆论围攻之下的矛盾和不安都演出来了，但我总觉得她的眼神里少了一些内涵。

直到我看了汉娜阿伦特的访谈录像，再回去看电影里的阿伦特，不得不说，完全是两个人。

我丝毫不否认戛纳影后芭芭拉苏科瓦的演技，但她与阿伦特的气质实在大相径庭，即便用力模仿，依然毫无交集。

真实的阿伦特有一种雌雄同体的粗砺感，不拘小节。

她斜坐在沙发上，呈打开的姿态，气场强大，抽烟动作早已和她融为一体，根本不会引起别人的注意。

采访中有一个细节，她忽然摘下眼镜大力揉搓眼睛，几乎要把眼珠挤出来了，完全不是优雅淑女的作派，更像一个斗士。

她的目光坚定，毫不畏惧，仿佛体内积蓄了足够的能量，来源源不断地提供“电力”，她绝不是多情敏感的，她的肢体和语言都异常干脆，不拖泥带水。

她声音低沉，语调平稳，时而微笑，充满智慧。

反观电影里的阿伦特，她太精致了，太多愁善感了，她的姿态是内收的，眼神是闪烁的，她思考的时候，我们只注意到了她指间的香烟。

她更像是一位温柔善良但心理素质不佳的母亲，而非犀利睿智大气沉着的思想家。

本片关于“平庸之恶”的理论，浓缩在了片尾的演讲当中，这段台词字字玑珠，非常精彩！

阿伦特跳出了犹太人受害者的立场，如实记录了“犹太委员会”的劣迹，实事求是的态度着实让人敬佩。

平庸之恶并非只存在于二战时期的德国人和犹太人之间，这种不思考只听上级指令的事，生活中比比皆是，只是恶有大有小罢了。

逃离“平庸之恶”，需要社会中的每个个体，不放弃思考，不逃避判断，心有敬畏，承担起应有的道德责任。

然而在极端的政策下，这么做谈何容易？

假设艾希曼经过了思考，明白杀害犹太人是反人类的行为，但是他权衡了一下，不杀的话自己和家人可能会有大麻烦，最后，他还是做出了更利己的决定……平庸之恶，恶的不是个体，而是极权暴政。

个体能做的，恐怕也只有对权力滥用保持一份警惕，以及对自己的道德底线，多一分坚守吧。

最后附上演讲全文： “《纽约客》派我去报导艾希曼审判，我认定法庭只有一个目的，行使正义。

这任务不简单，因为艾希曼所犯的罪行，在法典里找不到，而这样的罪犯在纽伦堡审判之前也前所未见。

即便如此，法官还是要把艾希曼界定为因其行为而受审的人，受审的并非“体制”，不是“历史”，不是“主义”，更不是反犹主义，只是一个人。

像艾希曼这样的纳粹战犯有个问题，他们坚持这些不是自己的主观行为，仿佛这样一来就没人应被惩罚，也没什么需要被宽恕。

他再三强调，与检方的指控恰巧相反，他从未做过任何自主行为。

他也没有一丁点儿“意图”，不管是好是坏，他做的只是“遵循命令”。

这是典型的纳粹式辩解……他让我们明白，世界上最极端的恶，是无名之辈所犯，行恶之人无动机，无信念，也非心怀恶念或以恶为志，他们只是拒绝当人，我将这种表现称作“平庸之恶”。

” 问：“阿伦特女士，你回避了这场争论最重要的一环。

你说如果犹太人领袖不和纳粹合作就不会死那么多人。

” 答：“这个议题在审判时出现，我如实报道。

我不得不厘清犹太领袖和纳粹之间的关系，因为他们曾直接参与了艾希曼的行为。

” 问：“你责怪犹太人自己造成了对他们的大屠杀？

” 答：“我从没责怪过犹太人！

反抗是不可行的，但或许在反抗与合作之间有别的形式，或许有些犹太领袖可以采取别的行为。

提出这个问题极其重要，因为犹太领袖所扮演的角色让我们更加深信，纳粹在欧洲社会中造成了全面的道德沦丧。

不仅在德国，几乎遍布欧洲，不单是施暴者，也包括受害者。

” 问：“迫害是专门反犹太人的，为什么你文中描绘艾希曼的所作所为是反人类的罪行?” 答：“因为犹太人是人，而纳粹恰恰就是想否定这一特性。

对犹太人犯下的罪行，就是对人类犯下的罪行。

众所周知，我是一个犹太人。

大家指责我是“反犹太”，替纳粹辩护，蔑视同胞。

这不是所谓的争论，这是诽谤!我不是在为艾希曼辩护，我只是想把这个极其平庸的人与他所做的恐怖行为联系起来。

尝试去理解并不等于要宽恕。

了解真相是我的职责，敢论述这件事的人就要敢担当。

自苏格拉底与柏拉图以来，我们把“思考”看成是自己与自己的无声对话，艾希曼拒绝成为人的同时，也放弃了身而为人的特质，就是“思考”的能力。

因此，他无法再进行道德判断。

这种“不思考”，导致了许多普通人犯下滔天恶行。

没错，我是用哲学的视角来考虑这个问题的。

思考的表现不是渊博的知识，而是一种区分对错美丑的能力。

我希望思考能带给人力量，在紧要关头避免惨剧的发生。

”

Hold on&Humble这部电影的姿态很特别（话说我喜欢法国版的海报，主题多明确！

）政治社会学题目上，却没有做那种大师级「我高贵冷艳思想高深你们这些凡人不能懂」的冷感，一开始就是两个中年妇女聊家常「我的老公是极品」，后面Hannah同丈夫之间打情骂俏，同朋友之间的嘻笑互动，是有烟火气有肉血感要把观众拉近的节奏。

但是另一方面又故意不完备背景信息——从标题开始就极简。

除了海德格尔大街一喊一嗓子大家都知道之外，Hannah Arendt是谁，她去以色列听审的被告是谁，犯了什么罪……这些关键信息都是一句话就带过去。

即是说，虽然电影的总体风格是亲切家常的，故事梗概也在一般文艺片的范畴内，但是观众应对其中所涉及的人物事件及思想有大概的认知才不至于落拍。

电影和观众的双向选择过程中，本片不挑剔入场观众对电影语言的解读能力——所要传达的信息多数由台词传递，却对知识层面有所要求，可以说是从标题到海报都有「屏蔽信息不足者」的功能。

这就很难说是具有「娱乐大众」属性了。

以「学习思考」为目的的电影而言，对历史背景的轻掠而过，意味着其最终的诉求乃是——请思考。

思考的主体，是自备一定信息量又有兴趣愿意花时间看这部电影的人。

而思考的主题内容是——思考本身。

听到了不等于就听懂了，听懂了不等于就听明白了。

地球人并不像瓦肯人那样拥有心电感应的能力，只能依赖符号交流。

符号在传达信息时会失真。

Hannah说英语带有很重的德国口音（以至于我要借助字幕才能听懂她在说什么）。

她周遭的德国小群体急眼了就用母语唇枪舌战，美国同事们在一旁干瞪眼。

这个「语言障碍」的梗在电影中被一再使用，最具象地表现了个体与个体、个体与人群、人群与人群之间「听到」、「听懂」和「听明白」之间的分歧差异：犹太人与非犹太人，二战幸存下来的犹太人和他们年轻理想化的后代，Hannah和她的读者们，她的支持者与反对者们……在各自表达、聆听和理解之间都存在这种「障碍」。

最简单绕过障碍的做法——依赖第三方解读。

在耶路撒冷庭审之前有一场很长的争论戏，听不懂德语的Mary先是求助于懂德语的学生，被告知「这么快的语速我听力不行」后暗搓搓想找Hannah的小秘书Lotte口译，后者的回答是「听Hannah自己跟你说不更好」——不愧是跟「大家」混的。

第三方解读为原有信号添加了噪音，最坏的情况会加大理解分歧。

比如在Hannah的文章出版后，那些根本没有看过文章或者没有看完的人，也纷纷打电话写信去谩骂，就是听从了第三方、甚至第四方的解读，根本不去听作者本人的陈述，就自以为「听懂了」。

如果想要听明白Hannah跟Hans在吵什么，应该听Hannah本人用英语陈述。

这正是影片前半段要跟观众达成的共识。

艾希曼的庭审基本使用了资料片段。

每一个片段结束后，都切到认真听审的Hannah。

这一段观众和主角是同步的——等于我们也在观看庭审纪录（虽非全部）。

在观看这段纪录的时候，我们做了什么样的思考？

下了什么样的判断？

庭审结束后，又有一段争论戏让Hannah表白自己的观点。

到此为止，事件人物（艾希曼）和核心人物（汉娜）的陈述结束。

听懂了。

但是有没有听明白呢？

英语并非Hannah的母语，所以这番陈述中可能还是有用词不当、发音错误、语法不严的地方，仍然存在表达与理解之间的间隙，这个间隙的填补，一是需要陈述者自己去弥补（比如Hannah请Mary纠正自己的发音，交由编辑部梳理自己的语法等等），二是聆听者需要「理性」地理解「话语本身」与思考「事实本身」。

这也就是影片后半段的内容。

片中《纽约客》的主编在审稿时要求Hannah不要加入「主观解读」，Hannah回答说「这是事实」，主编默认，就是这样的一个「填补过程」：根据内容提问、根据事实回答、理解回答的内容并思考事实是否真如其所说。

这个问题的关键在Hannah是否对于二战时的犹太领袖们的动机有否「臆测」。

所谓「臆测」典型的例子是Hannah的作品出版后，其同事断语「以她的聪明，不可能会想不到这篇文章带来的（负面）轰动效应」——在毫无事实根据没有对质的情况下主观对他人的私生活、思维活动、情绪体验等等进行「肯定/否定推论」。

电影以细节否认了这种「臆测」又故意突显这句台词，直接就表现了「臆测」的核心特征和社会性危害。

非常聪明。

「臆测」是一种群众喜闻乐见使用起来亦得心应手的「理解」方式。

这一方式的应用手法在影片的后半段，通过路人、读者、同事、朋友各个群体，得到了全方面多层次的展现。

通过台词有点有面地展示了时人对Hannah「反犹」、「藐视本民族」、「过于理性而忽略人类的感情」这些主要指责，又通过她去耶路撒冷看望故友、努力想挽回Hans的友谊、跟海德格尔之间纠结的感情牵扯而一一予以否定。

只有排除这些「臆测」的干扰，才能冷静地听明白。

近几年，在讨论（或者我更喜欢使用「吵架」这种更有情调的词）过程，我也会高频地使用「请不要臆测」却很少收到效果，最后常常就是我耐性崩盘。

所以关于那句引发口水仗的「（二战时的）犹太领袖们或有意或无意地（在事实上）配合了纳粹。

否则遇害人数当大大下降」这句话，我完全无法理解当时美国人与犹太人的反应，就不知道到底是因为我生在红旗下长在新中国的背景，还是本身所谓的「反社会」（「高贵冷艳」、「傲慢无礼」、「没有感情」etc）属性所致。

在我来看，如果要反驳Hannah，应当以这句话的内容是否属实（1. 当时的犹太群体多有「领袖」 2. 「领袖」们是否在事实上配合了纳粹的种族灭绝行动 3. 这种「配合」是否导致了更多的遇难者）；如果要深入，应当以Hannah从此种现象得出「庸恶」的「论据」-->「论点」路径是否清晰严谨。

诸如「伤害了xx人民的感情」的呻吟，或者「你是五毛」vs「你是美分」之类的无聊，既不能对事实有所证明，也不能对理论有所帮助，完全是浪费时间和精力，根本没有必要。

Hannah在影片后半段所遭遇的人身攻击，与影片前半段众人围绕艾希曼一案的争论，恰恰证明了她所谓「庸恶」的观点：翘着脚使用第三方解读是思维的懒惰（有别人已经嚼过看起来好像也嚼烂的东西就不需要自己消化了），「臆测」是思维的怯懦（直接用十字架指着「说话的人」大喊「丫被魔鬼附体了」就不需要与对方的观点直接对峙）。

纳粹，与那些寄恐吓信给Hannah的人，在「行为」上虽有不同，在「本质」上都是根源于集体思维的懒惰与怯懦。

至此，电影已经完成论证过程，并用Hannah铿锵激昂的演讲（暨自我辩白）结论。

但是为什么？

在片中时不时露脸的海德格尔留下这个问题是没有回答的：为什么一个天生的thinker仍会「庸恶」的时候？

为什么Mary会很自然地请Lotte翻译，在Lotte拒绝前观众也会很自然地认为这是合理的要求？

可能牛顿第一运动定律其实在思考这一运动上也成立：假如没有外力影响，我们总是在同一思维轨迹上前进。

这样比较节省能量（精力and时间），并且与社会大部分保持一致也会比较安全。

由此造成了很多思维上的「惯性」，绝大多数个体具备同样惯性时就形成了一个密闭空间，逃离这个惯性的个体思维就成为社会「禁忌」。

这些「惯性」和「禁忌」不允许你问「为什么」或者「目的何在」或者「应不应该」，只要求你「顺从不要越界」。

比如「你是犹太人就应该爱以色列」（可以扩展到各个民族与国家的对应关系），这一种立令对方放弃思考的要求其实无处不在且在某种社会环境下被视为「美德」（在帝国时期也有「你是雅利安人就应该恨犹太人」的「惯性」）。

一方面越是在社会生活中沉浮得久越是习从这种惯性很难立突摆脱（做网站的都很熟悉这套理论了，facebook的很多功能正是根据「花越多时间在上面就越难抛弃」的行为模式设计的），再者为保持所处空间的稳定性社会群体会尽力阻止个体突围。

托勒密系统上的球越加越多、计算越来越复杂，断不会止有哥白尼一个人觉得不妥，但是一旦突破这个体系，就意味着前一千年的思维方式作废，所有习惯于这个思维方式的人都要转轨道，而且万一新轨还不对头，就会造成chaos——社会动物最害怕的情况。

诸如「犹太人必须爱以色列」、「纳粹都是变态杀人狂」之类的观点就是当时托勒密系统上的小球，一旦提出「这个球的位置不对」必然要重新计算甚至更新一套新的理论体系。

所以那些听Hannah演讲的年轻学生们因受的惯性约束小，又有更多的时间和精力，是以更容易吸收接纳她的解说，而年长的教授们则更顽固己见不愿意去毁坏自己的「思维内部生态平衡」（一如当年的海德格尔），这并不意味着这些年轻学子，或者我们任何一个人，能免除「庸恶」的制约与诱惑。

在本片的案例中，Hannah最后能够抗住压力，除了她以及共同工作的人（丈夫、主编、Mary、学生们）hold on之外，还需要humble（我称之为「与狼共舞」）。

在针对Hannah的诸多指责中，唯有「傲慢」这一项被微妙地认同：Mary纠正Hannah的发音后周围友人纷纷低声「她不喜欢这样」，Mary说「是她自己要求我纠正她」之后更是友人惊诧。

这亦体现在恶意指责甚嚣尘上时，Hannah依然拒绝向公众解释，意下「反正他们不看就瞎嚷嚷或者根本就看不懂，那都是他们的事」。

但是一种突破禁忌的观点，必然需要进入到集体的轨道中去，然后才能使出那一把「改变速度（的标量或/及矢量）」的外力。

Hannah不但站到了讲台上，还正确地发出了chips这个词。

要双方面共同的努力——陈述者更耐心细致地解释，聆听者更理性主动地思考，才可能跨越「理解」的障碍。

影片的姿态是H&H具在，剩下就看观众们的了。

综合戴锦华老师的分享与我自己的观影体验，在我看来这部电影通过讲述汉娜阿伦特对纳粹暴行的思考结晶“平庸之恶”这一产物的诞生过程与其产生的影响而让观众认识到了思考这一人类特有意识的重要性。

我们经常提到三观不合，诚然，无论是先哲伟人，亦或是慵慵蚁民，都会基于自己的生活体验对事物思考出不同的认知。

放到影片中来看，有些人如艾希曼，完全放弃了自己的思考，甘愿做一个任人摆布的傀儡，眼前消逝的生命在他的头脑中不能形成任何一点为何如此的诘问，也借由放弃思考来放弃自我道德的抵抗，把一切罪孽推给他的上级，那个该死的希特勒。

还有一些人如那个出现在闪回画面中的伟大的却也是被诟病的哲学家海德格尔，他在二战中用自己的思考成果为希特勒背书，拥有并坚持自己的思想本身没有错，可当这一思考行为本身就是错误的、反人类的，那只会使自己堕入更黑暗的深处。

当然，影片充满希望的把第三种人推到了我们面前，一个拥有并坚持自己的思想成果的汉娜阿伦特，她不像她所鄙夷的艾希曼一样只会接受不会思考，也不像她的老师海德格尔一样，坚守自己的思想阵营到罔顾现实刚愎自用的程度，她坚守但也质疑，从影片最后我们知道她终身都在不断思考、不断反刍自己的思想结晶。

这也是导演透过汉娜的故事想要留给观众们的礼物，影片没有停留在简单的对“平庸之恶”这一思想理论的赞扬或鞭笞中，而是引导观众自己去思考，并把它带入到自己的生命体验中，当我们面临如汉娜一般的处境中，我们能否在不放弃思考的同时也不断去质疑自己的思考究竟是对是错，从而即保持警醒又不自恋。

——“咨诹善道,察纳雅言。

”

它所表现出的，给予人的感觉粗暴而直接。

这样一部传记电影，看起来似乎深刻，有人还说“它达到了一个传记电影少有的高度”。

然而，我看到的，它只是将汉娜一个极深刻且具代表性的关于“平庸的恶”这个论题拿来包裹整部电影，于是，它看似将电影带入了一种“前所未有的深刻”，但其实缺乏真正有价值的内容。

就像一个画家想要表现美丽的海伦，却只是为她布满华丽的装饰，却无法真正表现出她的美。

它为观众带来的更多的是一种快感，一种结果，一种光环和成就，而不是什么前所未有的深刻。

电影里，一个从头到尾都在抽烟的汉娜，甚至是一开始就给了一段长达两分钟的抽烟镜头。

这在日常生活中，一个人思考一个问题，抽一根烟这确实是稀松平常的事情，但是当你用一种文学方式，或者是如这种影像的方式去表现它，甚至是强化它，这却可以给予他人更多的解读内容。

对于一名女性哲学家来讲，这带有明显的标识，应该避免聚焦于此，而不是强化。

这可以体现什么呢，或者说对于人们理解汉娜有什么帮助呢？

只有曲解。

不应该用这种粗暴的方式去体现一个独立的女性，这甚至让人看不到比其汉娜本身性格特点更多抑或是更重要的内容。

不过后面还有更多的让人难以招架的方式。

譬如他人对于汉娜的评价。

当汉娜因为艾希曼审判一事，想为《纽约客》撰稿，报社里的成员这样谈论：”难以置信，那个汉娜阿伦特竟然想要为我们写稿。

“…..”她应该像其他人一样乞求得到为《纽约客》撰稿的机会。

“”弗里西斯，是她写了《极权主义的起源》“”什么鬼题目。

“”这是二十世纪最重要的一本书，去看看吧。

“她是第一位用我们的西方的语言文化来描绘第三帝国的作家。

“它是辉煌的，但抽象的。

“哇哦，真是辉煌。

一个带蔑视的形象，一个洋洋得意的形象，一个年迈的老人下结论。

三人各自的表现将这种成功后所带来荣耀和名誉的一种影响，在他人的一唱一合里发挥极致。

我觉得导演不懂得什么是含蓄。

当然，这是一种常规套路。

但是这一段话就这么赤裸裸地砸给了我，淬不及防。

如同在关于艾希曼的审判那段一样，人们在汉娜思索、疑惑、闪烁的眼神里看到了快感的临界点。

因为人们知道《艾希曼在耶路撒冷》这部重要的作品即将诞生。

然后在演讲台上达到了高潮。

因为这是一部汉娜阿伦特的传记电影，如果不是这个定位我想我不会这么失望，顶多就是一部稀松平常的电影。

它做出一副道貌岸然的模样，人们总是聚在一起谈论种种深刻的话题，然而影片中的汉娜以一种傲慢的、似乎总是可掌握全局的姿态以及总是特写的抽烟及思考镜头，以及干瘪粗暴的表现方式都无一不是说明它用一种平庸的方式的去论述平庸。